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The authorities have been slow to implement social media in their crisis communication strategies (Hornmoen et al., 2018; Perng et al., 2012) .
There is a need for more knowledge on what role social media can play during crisis situations such as severe terrorist attacks, so that the authorities and others (NGOs, journalists, those targeted, etc.) can become better equipped to acquire and share SA. This chapter presents some recommendations for the authorities and others on the uses and functions of social media during severe terrorist attacks, based on an analysis of social media activity during the 22 July 2011 attacks in Oslo and on Utøya.
2 The chapter briefly presents the analysed data, the theoretical framework of SA as it relates to social media and crisis communication and the key findings of the case study, before concluding with the main recommendations for the authorities in particular on how to deal with social media in a crisis situation such as a severe terrorist attack.
SITUATION AWARENESS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION
A key communicative challenge during a crisis event is to achieve adequate SA for all parties: those directly affected, official crisis management and response institutions, journalistic institutions, NGOs and other institutions and the public. Endsley (1995, p. 36) defines SA as 'the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future'. SA is, in other words, being aware of what is going on at a given time and in a given space; how to understand it, and how to act on that knowledge immediately and properly.
Mundane and everyday activities such as walking and driving require constant SA, as do many other activities in a wide array of environments.
However, it is in complex and changing situations À like a sudden crisis À that SA becomes difficult to acquire, according to Endsley (1995, p. 33) . Achieving and maintaining SA is a process involving a lot of 'situational assessment' (Endsley, 1995, p. 36) , and it is in this process of assessment that social media can play a crucial role in a crisis. Social media are potentially an 'awareness system' (Maireder & Ausserhofer, 2014) that can engage citizens in crowdsourcing information activities; they thereby take on importance in disseminating emergency alerts, in citizens' 279 Social Media and Situation Awareness During Terrorist Attacks self-organisation of local responses to a crisis and, ultimately, in how a crisis situation is assessed.
Social media do, however, make the acquisition of SA more complex, as the process becomes networked instead of individual and more improvisational (Mendonça, 2007) . Perng et al. (2012, p. 9) argue that the theory of SA does not sufficiently take into account 'how awareness is developed and updated through distributed collaboration by those who are situated in very different socio-technological circumstances, and how this is a matter of "configuring awareness"'. Viewing the acquisition of SA as a networked collaboration, in which awareness is configured through joint efforts, is important for fully understanding how crisis communication functions in social media. It is not enough for key communicators in official crisis management and response institutions to send out an official statement in a tweet, a Facebook update or similar. They need to understand how that message is disseminated within social networks, what is required for its proper dissemination, how people in different sociotechnical contexts might receive and interpret the message and also expect feedback in the form of questions, worries and possible updates. All this requires participation and interaction on a completely different level than in other mass media channels of communication.
Furthermore, awareness configuration is not something which is transferred from one person or institution to another in social media. It is a many-to-many process, in which official crisis management and response institutions, journalistic institutions and others are parts of a larger network to which they need to listen in order to acquire and maintain SA themselves. The Norwegian Twitter-sphere during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attack is a good example of how this many-to-many awareness configuration might work (see Chapter 1 in this volume). As analysed by Ottosen (2015) and in Chapter 3 in this volume, this process is difficult if crisis authorities do not participate in social media.
Key communicators in official crisis management and response institutions, and to an extent, journalists too, are lagging behind in dealing with this networked, collaborative way of creating SA, according to Perng et al. (2012) . Research has shown how members of the public might use social media to organise help and respond to a crisis (Perng et al., 2012; Starbird & Palen, 2011) ; such efforts might be important in the general assessment of a crisis situation. (Dyb et al., 2014) .
At 19.30, the police confirmed that seven people had been killed by the bomb. At 21.30, the police reported 10 deaths on Utøya. At 22.45, the minister of Justice, Knut Storberget, confirmed that the apprehended terrorist was ethnically Norwegian. At 03.17 on 23 July, the police stated that the number of causalities on Utøya was far greater than previously presumed, and at 03.50, they reported that 80 people had been killed on Utøya. The correct number of casualties was not announced until Monday 25 July.
The 22 Although some research projects have previously examined aspects of social media activities during the 22 July attack (see, for instance, Eriksson, 2016; Kaufmann, 2015; Kverndokk, 2013; Perng et al., 2012) , the RESCUE project is the first research project to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the uses, functions and activities of social media in the context of the attack.
The data analysed in the RESCUE project on the 22 July 2011 case consist of:
• a collection of 2.2 million tweets acquired from Gnip, Twitter's enterprise API platform, representing the Norwegian Twitter-sphere from 20 July to 28 August 2011 (see Chapter 1 for a further presentation and discussion of this data);
• qualitative interviews with survivors from Utøya and content from their Facebook accounts (see Frey, 2018 and Chapter 2 in this volume for a further presentation and discussion of this data);
• qualitative interviews with Norwegian information officers and key communicators in the relevant sectors, and with journalists (see Hornmoen et al., 2018 and Chapter 4 in this volume for a further discussion and presentation of this data);
• qualitative interviews with journalists who worked on 22 July 2011 (see Konow-Lund & Olsson, 2017 and Chapter 7 for a further presentation and discussion of this data); and
• content from Norwegian online and print newspapers on 22 and 23
July 2011 (see Ottosen & Bull, 2016; Steensen & Eide, forthcoming 2018, for a further presentation and discussion of this data).
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KEY FINDINGS
The findings of the case study of social media activity during and after the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway are fully presented and discussed in various journal articles, book chapters, and in the chapters of this volume.
These publications will be referred to in the following summary of key findings, divided into three sections: (1) findings from the analysis of the Norwegian Twitter-sphere and newspaper content; (2) findings from interviews with survivors from Utøya and (3) findings from interviews with journalists, information officers and other key communicators.
FINDINGS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE NORWEGIAN TWITTER-SPHERE
The terrorist attacks prompted a 200 per cent increase in Twitter activity in Norway on 22 July 2011; the Norwegian Twitter-sphere was dominated by the event. Hashtags were used to structure and make sense of the otherwise chaotic communication, and the 10 most used hashtags during 22 and 23 July were all related to the attacks, accounting for 60 per cent of all hashtag use over those two days. The most popular hashtags were #prayfornorway, #Utøya and #Oslo, while the hashtag #osloexpl was the most used during the critical hours on 22 July (see Chapter 1 for a further presentation and discussion of these findings).
Although hashtags were used more during the critical hours of 22 July (15.25À21.00) than during the following days, less than half the tweets posted in these hours contained hashtags. Furthermore, many of the hashtags used early on were misleading and it took more than 30 minutes after the bomb blast before the Twitter-sphere had established a hashtag (#osloexpl) that made it possible to monitor Twitter appropriately for updates about the crisis situation (see Chapter 1).
Given the delay in identifying the perpetrator, the Twitter-sphere was vulnerable to rumour and speculation. In the early phase, rumours about a possible al-Qaida attack circulated in the Norwegian Twitter-sphere, and a large number of tweets blamed radical Muslims. This was, to a certain extent, accompanied by hostility to immigrants and Muslims in general, 283 Social Media and Situation Awareness During Terrorist Attacks though this tendency was also criticised by others, warning about a blame game before the facts were on the table (Ottosen, 2015) . July and 11.00 on 23 July contained hyperlinks, and that more than one-third of these tweets linked to national or international news media.
Contents from traditional news media were much more important as sources on Twitter than social media were important as sources for traditional news media.
The Norwegian authorities and public bodies were not particularly visible on Twitter during and after the attacks. Of the 8,290 different Norwegian Twitter accounts posting at least one tweet between 15.25 and 21.00 on 22 July, only nine came from public bodies. These nine accounts posted in total 22 tweets during the critical hours; the official account of Oslo Airport was the most active with eight tweets containing updates on how the terrorist attack was affecting traffic to and from the airport. The operating police departments, the Norwegian Security Police (PST), the fire departments or other public emergency offices were absent from Twitter, even though they were mentioned several times by other Twitter users who wanted them to communicate on the social medium. There is, however, one notable exception to this lack of communication on Twitter from public bodies: Oslo University Hospital used Twitter successfully to attract and coordinate blood donors (see Chapters 3 and 4).
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FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH SURVIVORS FROM UTØYA
As part of the case study, eight survivors from Utøya were interviewed indepth about their social media use and experience prior to, during and after the terrorist attack. All of them were users of social media. Three of them actively used social media during the attack, while some did not even consider using their phones because they were too preoccupied with simply surviving (all findings reported here and later are presented and discussed in Frey, 2018) .
Facebook was their preferred social medium for contacting their near and dear ones, and for giving and receiving information, especially after the perpetrator had been apprehended by the police. One of the interviewees had a large follower base on Twitter and tweeted information on what was going on during the attack. This interviewee found Twitter more efficient than contacting the police, which she/he also did, but without the sense that they were taking him/her seriously. Another of the interviewees used Facebook to update his/her network about the shootings, and understood from comments that those outside the island were not aware of the extent of the shooting. The active social media users all muted their phones and checked Twitter, Facebook and online news media for updates as a way of acquiring SA. One learned via social media that the shooter was dressed as a policeman, which was important information. Another was told there was only one terrorist, whom she/he later learned had been captured by the police.
However, all interviewees told how young people on the island experienced many practical obstacles: their mobile phones were running low on battery power, or they lost their phones when fleeing or swimming. Some were afraid that the terrorist(s) was monitoring social media. Nevertheless, young people on Utøya used Facebook and Twitter to tell outsiders not to call them, afraid that the sound and light of mobile phones ringing could attract the terrorist's attention.
Furthermore, all the interviewees remarked on the difficulty of ascertaining whether something on social media is a rumour or misinformation, when under attack, although one interviewee pointed out that it is possible to verify Twitter accounts.
Once rescued, all the interviewees used Facebook to contact friends and family to let them know they were safe. A few also tweeted. In the event of being caught up in another crisis situation, six of the eight would 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the case study findings presented earlier, we can conclude that:
1. Twitter was an important medium in acquiring SA for at least some of the victims, for the public, and potentially also for the police, other emergency institutions, governmental bodies and public offices during the attacks on 22 July 2011;
2. Key governmental bodies and public offices did not use social media as important sources of information and channels of communication As our case study shows, hashtags were an important feature in structuring communication on Twitter during the terrorist attacks. However, it took time for a relevant and much-used hashtag to be established, and the majority of tweets about the attack did not contain hashtags. Eyewitnesses and victims who post important information are not likely to be skilled communicators and therefore might not consider using hashtags.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has summarised the findings of a case study on social media activities during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. Based on these findings, we offer seven recommendations for key communicators in official crisis management and response institutions, NGOs, journalistic institutions and, to a degree, also the public and victims: (1) acknowledge social media as important and master cross-social media monitoring and features; (2) synchronise communication and establish a SOP; (3) establish and make known a joint social media emergency account; (4) participate, interact and take the lead; (5) be aware of non-hashtagged content; (6) implement verification tools and practices and (7) engage with and learn from celebrities.
We believe that implementing these recommendations is crucial for the authorities in particular, but also for NGOs, journalistic institutions and others who might have a role as key communicator during a crisis.
Underpinning these recommendations is a recognition of the important role played by social media in the configuration of SA during and after a crisis situation. As our case study of the terrorist attacks in Norway shows, social media will be used as vehicles for configuring SA, even if the authorities are not taking part in the process. Acknowledging this means acknowledging that SA configuration during a crisis situation has become a collaborative and networked process, in which the authorities, journalists and other traditional key communicators need to take a different role than perhaps used to be the case. 
